Serial Number
13008
Course Number
ECON5112
Course Identifier
323 U8110
No Class
- 3 Credits
Elective
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS / GRADUATE INSTITUTE OF ECONOMICS
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS
GRADUATE INSTITUTE OF ECONOMICS
Elective- JOSEPH TAO-YI WANG
- View Courses Offered by Instructor
COLLEGE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS
josephw@ntu.edu.tw
- 社科院大樓754室
02-33668411
Website
http://homepage.ntu.edu.tw/~josephw/
- Please go to my teaching webpage for the most updated information: http://homepage.ntu.edu.tw/~josephw/teaching.htm
- Mon 2, 3, 4
社科研607
Type 1
32 Student Quota
NTU 30 + non-NTU 2
Specialization Program
Public Opinion Analysis/ Data Science for Political Science
- English
- NTU COOL
- Core Capabilities and Curriculum Planning
- NotesThe course is conducted in English。
- Limits on Course Adding / Dropping
Restriction: juniors and beyond or Restriction: MA students and beyond or Restriction: Ph. D students
NTU Enrollment Status
Enrolled0/30Other Depts0/4Remaining0Registered0- Course DescriptionThis is an upper division and graduate level course on experimental economics, focusing on behavioral game theory. The purpose is to introduce experimental economics to students so they can start their own research in this field. You are also expected to perform replication and present them.
- Course Objectivehttps://homepage.ntu.edu.tw/~josephw/experimental_25F.htm Specific goals of this course include: 1. Introduction to Experimental Economics: After this class, students are expected to name classic experiments in each field of behavioral game theory and describe how their results affirm or differ from economic theory and field data. 2. Evaluate Current Research: After this class, students are expected to develop the ability to read journal articles in experimental economics and evaluate them. 3. Experimental Design: After this class, students are expected to understand how experiments are run and designed. Students have to write a research proposal to: a. Propose an economic experiment (and write sample instructions) which has: i. Real Incentives (so choices have real consequences), ii. A Good Control Group (to compare with Treatment group), iii. Random Assignment (to the Treatment and Control groups), iv. No deception (to establish reputation so real incentives are believed). b. Argue why should we care about this experiment and why the experiment is designed this way (compared to other possible designs), and, c. Relate your experiment to existing literature (if any) and describe expected results and/or methods to analyze the data with appropriate power analysis.
- Course RequirementStudents are also expected to complete weekly problem sets on the game theory behind the experiments discussed in class in preparation for the midterm and final quizzes. They will also form groups to present one book chapter and one journal article in class.
- Expected weekly study hours before and/or after class3-10 hours depending on game theory background.
- Office Hour
Mon 12:10 - 12:40 after class or by email appointment - Designated Reading1. Camerer (2003), Behavioral Game Theory, Princeton University Press. (BGT) 2. Kagel and Roth, ed. (2016), Handbook of Experimental Economics, Vol. 2, Princeton University Press (HEE2). 3. Gneezy (2023), Mixed Signals, Yale University Press. (MS)
- References4. Holt (2019), Markets, Games and Strategic Behavior: An Introduction to Experimental Economics, 2nd ed., Princeton University Press. (Undergraduate; Holt) 5. Moffatt (2019), Experimetrics Lecture Notes for NTU mini-course. (EMT) 6. Moffatt (2016), Experimetrics: Econometrics for Experimental Economics, Palgrave. 7. Riley (2012), Essential Microeconomics, Cambridge University Press. (EM). 8. Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green (1995), Microeconomic Theory, Oxford UP. (MWG) 9. Kagel and Roth, ed. (1995), Handbook of Experimental Economics, Vol. 1, Princeton University Press (HEE1). 10. Capra, Croson, Rigdon and Rosenblat, ed. (2020), Handbook of Experimental Game Theory, Edward Elgar Publishing. (EGT)
- Grading
50% Midterm and Final Quiz
Weekly problem sets in BGT are assigned, which questions (randomly) selected to appear in midterm (10/13) and final quiz (12/15).
25% Group Presentation
20-minute oral presentation of one book chapter (10%) and one research article (10%) and providing weekly feedback to others (5%).
25% Final Proposal
Present/submit experimental proposal (<4 pages, due 12/15).
- Adjustment methods for students
Adjustment Method Description A2 以錄影輔助
Assisted by video
- Make-up Class Information
- Course Schedule
9/1Week 1 9/1 Experimental Economics and Behavioral Game Theory (BGT, Ch.1; Holt; Wang) 9/8Week 2 9/8 Risk and Time Preferences (Holt, Ch.3); Basic Principles of Experimental Design (BGT, A1.2) 9/15Week 3 9/15 Social Preferences (BGT, Ch.2; HEE2, Ch.4; UG, DG, Trust; Lin-20) 9/22Week 4 9/22 Mixed-Strategy Equilibrium (BGT, Ch.3), [MS-1/2] 9/29Week 5 9/29 Teacher’s Day Long Weekend (no class) 10/6Week 6 10/6 Moon Festival (no class) 10/13Week 7 10/13 Midterm Quiz (on Homework for BGT, Ch.1-3 and Holt, Ch.3) 10/20Week 8 10/20 Midterm Proposal Presentation 10/27Week 9 10/27 Bargaining (BGT, Ch.4), [MS-3] 11/3Week 10 11/3 Dominant Solvable Games (BGT, Ch.5), [MS-4] 11/10Week 11 11/10 Level-k Thinking (Crawford-13) [MS-5] 11/17Week 12 11/17 Estimating Learning (BGT, Ch.6; HEE2, Ch.10; EMT 18) [MS-6] 11/24Week 13 11/24 Coordination (BGT, Ch.7); [MS-7] 12/1Week 14 12/1 Signaling and Reputation (BGT, Ch.8) 12/8Week 15 12/8 Final Proposal Presentation 12/15Week 16 12/15 Final Quiz (on Homework for BGT, Ch.4-8); Final Proposal Due